EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Optimal Revelation of Life-Changing Information

Nikolaus Schweizer () and Nora Szech
Additional contact information
Nikolaus Schweizer: Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, 5037 AB Tilburg, The Netherlands

Management Science, 2018, vol. 64, issue 11, 5250-5262

Abstract: Information about the future may be instrumentally useful yet scary. For example, many patients shy away from precise genetic tests about their dispositions for severe diseases. They are afraid that a bad test result could render them desperate as a result of anticipatory feelings. We show that partially revealing tests are typically optimal when anticipatory utility interacts with an instrumental need for information. The same result emerges when patients rely on probability weighting. Optimal tests provide only two signals, which renders them easily implementable. While the good signal is typically precise, the bad one remains coarse. This way, patients have a substantial chance to learn that they are free of the genetic risk in question. Yet even if the test outcome is bad, they do not end in a situation without hope.

Keywords: test design; revelation of information; design of beliefs; medical tests; anticipatory utility; Huntington’s disease (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2913 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Revelation of Life-Changing Information (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Optimal revelation of life-changing information (2016) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:64:y:2018:i:11:p:5250-5262

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-05
Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:64:y:2018:i:11:p:5250-5262