Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show

Uyanga Turmunkh (), Martijn J. van den Assem () and Dennie van Dolder
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Uyanga Turmunkh: Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods, IÉSEG School of Management, 59000 Lille, France
Martijn J. van den Assem: School of Business and Economics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands

Management Science, 2019, vol. 65, issue 10, 4795-4812

Abstract: We investigate the credibility of nonbinding preplay statements about cooperative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show in which contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. We depart from the conventional binary approach of classifying statements as promises or not, and propose a more fine-grained two-by-two typology inspired by the idea that lying aversion leads defectors to prefer statements that are malleable to ex-post interpretation as truths. Our empirical analysis shows that statements that carry an element of conditionality or implicitness are associated with a lower likelihood of cooperation, and confirms that malleability is a good criterion for judging the credibility of cheap talk.

Keywords: deception; lying aversion; game show; prisoner’s dilemma; communication; cooperation; cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Working Paper: Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show (2019)
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