Moral Perceptions of Advised Actions

Lucas Coffman and Alexander Gotthard-Real ()
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Alexander Gotthard-Real: Department of Business Administration, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá 110231, Colombia
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alexander Gotthard Real

Management Science, 2019, vol. 65, issue 8, 3904-3927

Abstract: Can an organization avoid blame for an unpopular action when an adviser advises it to do it? We present experimental evidence suggesting this is the case—advice to be selfish substantially decreases punishment of being selfish. Further, this result is true despite advisers’ misaligned incentives, known to all: Through a relational contract incentive, advisers are motivated to tell the decision makers what they want to hear. Through incentivized elicitations, we find suggestive evidence that advice moves punishment by affecting beliefs of how necessary the selfish action was. In follow-up treatments, however, we show advice does not decrease punishment solely through a beliefs channel. Advice not only changes beliefs about what happened, but also the perceived morality of it. Finally, in treatments in which advisers are available, the data suggest selfish decision makers act more selfishly.

Keywords: economics; behavior and behavioral decision making; design of experiments; economics; microeconomic behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:65:y:2019:i:8:p:3904-3927

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