Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Healthcare Rationing

Parag Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez (), Utku Unver and M. Bumin Yenmez
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Tayfun Sönmez: Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02467

Management Science, 2024, vol. 70, issue 6, 3999-4036

Abstract: A priority system has traditionally been the protocol of choice for the allocation of scarce life-saving resources during public health emergencies. COVID-19 revealed the limitations of this allocation rule. Many argue that priority systems abandon ethical values, such as equity, by discriminating against disadvantaged communities. We show that a restrictive feature of the traditional priority system largely drives these limitations. Following minimalist market design , an institution design paradigm that integrates research and policy efforts, we formulate pandemic allocation of scarce life-saving resources as a new application of market design. Interfering only with the restrictive feature of the priority system to address its shortcomings, we formulate a reserve system as an alternative allocation rule. Our theoretical analysis develops a general theory of reserve design. We relate our analysis to debates during COVID-19 and describe the impact of our paper on policy and practice.

Keywords: crisis standards of care; triage; multiprinciple allocation framework; minimalist market design; reserve system; COVID-19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00930 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing (2023)
Working Paper: Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:70:y:2024:i:6:p:3999-4036

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