Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing
Parag Pathak,
Tayfun S\"onmez,
Utku Unver and
M. Bumin Yenmez
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tayfun Sönmez
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
A priority system has traditionally been the protocol of choice for the allocation of scarce life-saving resources during public health emergencies. Covid-19 revealed the limitations of this allocation rule. Many argue that priority systems abandon ethical values such as equity by discriminating against disadvantaged communities. We show that a restrictive feature of the traditional priority system largely drives these limitations. Following minimalist market design, an institution design paradigm that integrates research and policy efforts, we formulate pandemic allocation of scarce life-saving resources as a new application of market design. Interfering only with the restrictive feature of the priority system to address its shortcomings, we formulate a reserve system as an alternative allocation rule. Our theoretical analysis develops a general theory of reserve design. We relate our analysis to debates during Covid-19 and describe the impact of our paper on policy and practice.
Date: 2020-08, Revised 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2008.00374 Latest version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Healthcare Rationing (2024) 
Working Paper: Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2008.00374
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