Testing, Voluntary Social Distancing, and the Spread of an Infection
Daron Acemoglu,
Ali Makhdoumi (),
Azarakhsh Malekian () and
Asuman Ozdaglar ()
Additional contact information
Ali Makhdoumi: Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708
Azarakhsh Malekian: Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6, Canada
Asuman Ozdaglar: Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Operations Research, 2024, vol. 72, issue 2, 533-548
Abstract:
We study the effects of testing policy on voluntary social distancing and the spread of an infection. Agents decide their social activity level, which determines a social network over which the virus spreads. Testing enables the isolation of infected individuals, slowing down the infection. However, greater testing also reduces voluntary social distancing or increases social activity, exacerbating the spread of the virus. We show that the effect of testing on infections is nonmonotone. This nonmonotonicity also implies that the optimal testing policy may leave some of the testing capacity of society unused.
Keywords: Policy Modeling and Public Sector OR; game theory; network formation; contagion process; voluntary social distancing; optimal testing policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2220 (application/pdf)
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Working Paper: Testing, Voluntary Social Distancing and the Spread of an Infection (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:72:y:2024:i:2:p:533-548
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