Testing, Voluntary Social Distancing and the Spread of an Infection

Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian and Asuman Ozdaglar

No 27483, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study the effects of testing policy on voluntary social distancing and the spread of an infection. Agents decide their social activity level, which determines a social network over which the virus spreads. Testing enables the isolation of infected individuals, slowing down the infection. But greater testing also reduces voluntary social distancing or increases social activity, exacerbating the spread of the virus. We show that the effect of testing on infections is non-monotone. This non-monotonicity also implies that the optimal testing policy may leave some of the testing capacity of society unused.

JEL-codes: D62 D85 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net and nep-soc
Note: EFG EH PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

Published as Daron Acemoglu & Ali Makhdoumi & Azarakhsh Malekian & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2024. "Testing, Voluntary Social Distancing, and the Spread of an Infection," Operations Research, vol 72(2), pages 533-548.

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Journal Article: Testing, Voluntary Social Distancing, and the Spread of an Infection (2024)
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