Can market mechanisms solve the refugee crisis?
Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga () and
Martin Hagen ()
IZA World of Labor, 2021, No 244v2, 244
Ever since the major inflow of refugees (the “refugee crisis”) in 2015 and 2016, there has been heated debate about the appropriate distribution of refugees in the EU. Current policies revolve around mandatory quotas, which disregard the preferences of EU members and refugees alike. This problem can be addressed with two market mechanisms. First, tradable quotas minimize the cost of asylum provision for host countries. Second, a matching system gives refugees more discretion over where they are sheltered. While this proposal is theoretically appealing, it has yet to be tested in practice.
Keywords: international migration; refugees; EU asylum policy; tradable quotas; matching; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 H87 K33 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Can market mechanisms solve the refugee crisis? (2016)
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