Can market mechanisms solve the refugee crisis?

Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga

IZA World of Labor, 2016, No 244, 244

Abstract: The unequal distribution of refugees across countries could unravel the international refugee protection system or, in the case of the EU, hinder a common policy response to refugee crises. A way to distribute refugees efficiently, while respecting their rights, is to combine two market mechanisms. First, a market for tradable refugee admission quotas that allows refugees to be established wherever it is less costly to do so. Second, a matching system that links refugees to their preferred destinations, and host countries to their preferred types of refugees. The proposal is efficient but has yet to be tested in practice.

Keywords: international migration; refugees; tradable quotas; matching; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 F5 H87 I3 K33 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Journal Article: Can market mechanisms solve the refugee crisis? (2021)
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