Appearances Can Be Deceiving: Lessons Learned Re-Implementing Axelrod's 'Evolutionary Approach to Norms'

José Manuel Galán () and Luis Izquierdo
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José Manuel Galán: http://www.josema.galan.name/
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jose Manuel Galan

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2005, vol. 8, issue 3, 2

Abstract: In this paper we try to replicate the simulation results reported by Axelrod (1986) in an influential paper on the evolution of social norms. Our study shows that Axelrod's results are not as reliable as one would desire. We can obtain the opposite results by running the model for longer, by slightly modifying some of the parameters, or by changing some arbitrary assumptions in the model. This re-implementation exercise illustrates the importance of running stochastic simulations several times for many periods, exploring the parameter space adequately, complementing simulation with analytical work, and being aware of the scope of our simulation models.

Keywords: Replication; Agent-Based Modelling; Evolutionary Game Theory; Social Dilemmas; Norms; Metanorms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06-30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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