EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Individual and Collective Choice and Voting in Common Pool Resource Problem with Heterogeneous Actors

Magdalena Margreiter (), Matthias Sutter and Dennis Dittrich

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2005, vol. 32, issue 2, 271 pages

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the effects of heterogeneity in common pool resource (CPR) problems. We examine whether heterogeneity impedes or facilitates coordination on an efficient use of a CPR by proposing and voting on allocation schemes. In a full information design we compare extractions and voting behavior in heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. If the CPR is extracted individually, we find no difference in efficiency between heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. However, when groups can vote on allocation schemes, homogeneous groups are more likely to reach an efficient agreement than heterogeneous groups. Copyright Springer 2005

Keywords: common pool resources; experiment; heterogeneity; voting; C91; C92; D70; D74; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10640-005-3359-9 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:enreec:v:32:y:2005:i:2:p:241-271

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... al/journal/10640/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10640-005-3359-9

Access Statistics for this article

Environmental & Resource Economics is currently edited by Ian J. Bateman

More articles in Environmental & Resource Economics from Springer, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:32:y:2005:i:2:p:241-271