Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance – A Case Study

Sandra Rousseau and Stef Proost

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2005, vol. 32, issue 3, 337-365

Abstract: In this paper, we aim to include rule making, implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs into the cost comparison of policy instruments. We use a simple partial equilibrium model and apply it to the textile industry. The model includes discrete abatement functions and costly monitoring and enforcement. The case study uses individual firm data to simulate the differences in abatement costs and compliance decisions between firms. We compare combinations of regulatory instruments (emission taxes, emission standards and technology standards) and enforcement instruments (criminal fines, civil fines and transaction offers). We show that the inclusion of information, monitoring and enforcement costs indeed alters the relative cost efficiency of the different instruments. Copyright Springer 2005

Keywords: efficiency; environmental management; government policy; illegal behaviour and the enforcement of law; transaction costs; D23; D61; K42; Q2; Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-005-6646-6

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