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Management of common property resources: Limits to voluntary collective action

M. Narsimha Murty

Environmental & Resource Economics, 1994, vol. 4, issue 6, 594 pages

Abstract: This paper finds that the voluntary collective action may be an alternative to market and government in the management of common property resources. In developing countries, the people's capabilities to harness the preserved commons and the fairness in the appropriation of benefits from them are the limits on the voluntary collective action. It shows that collective action is possible if an outside agency plays the role of a catalyst in mitigating these limits. It also shows that there can be mutually beneficial sharing arrangements between government and village communities for the management of local forest resources. The standard result that common and state property resources turn into open access resources as population grows also holds good for the natural resources jointly managed by government and people. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994

Keywords: JEL Classification; H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/BF00693047

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