Bertrand colludes more than Cournot

Sigrid Suetens and Jan Potters

Experimental Economics, 2007, vol. 10, issue 1, 77 pages

Abstract: On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets. Copyright Economic Science Association 2007

Keywords: Collusion; Quantity-choice and price-choice experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9132-2

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