Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game

David Danz, Dietmar Fehr and Dorothea Kübler

Experimental Economics, 2012, vol. 15, issue 4, 622-640

Abstract: We study beliefs and actions in a repeated normal-form game. Using a level-k model of limited strategic reasoning and allowing for other-regarding preferences, we classify action and belief choices with regard to their strategic sophistication and study their development over time. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure, feedback about actions in the previous period and random matching, we run treatments (i) with fixed matching, (ii) without information about the other player’s payoffs, and (iii) without feedback about previous play. In all treatments with feedback, we observe more strategic play (increasing by 15 percent) and higher-level beliefs (increasing by 18 percent) over time. Without feedback, neither beliefs nor actions reach significantly higher levels of reasoning (with increases of 2 percentage points for actions and 6 percentage points for beliefs). The levels of reasoning reflected in actions and beliefs are highly consistent, but less so for types with lower levels of reasoning. Copyright Economic Science Association 2012

Keywords: Beliefs; Level-k model; Learning; C72; C92; D83; D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game (2010)
Working Paper: Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game (2010)
Working Paper: Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-Form Game (2008)
Working Paper: Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:15:y:2012:i:4:p:622-640

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9317-9

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