Will you accept without knowing what? The Yes-No game in the newspaper and in the lab

Werner Güth () and Oliver Kirchkamp

Experimental Economics, 2012, vol. 15, issue 4, 656-666

Abstract: In this paper we compare behaviour in a newspaper experiment with behaviour in the laboratory. Our workhorse is the Yes-No game. Unlike in ultimatum games responders of the Yes-No games do not know the proposal when deciding whether to accept or not. We use two different amounts that can be shared (100€ and 1000€). Unlike in other experiments with the ultimatum game we find a (small) effect of the size of the stakes. In line with findings for the ultimatum game, we find more generosity among women, older participants, and participants who submit their decision via postal mail than via Internet. By comparing our results with other studies (using executives or students), we demonstrate, at least for this type of game, the external validity of lab research. Copyright The Author(s) 2012

Keywords: Newspaper experiment; External validity; Yes-No game; C91; C93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9319-7

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