Shifting the blame to a powerless intermediary

Regine Oexl () and Zachary Grossman

Experimental Economics, 2013, vol. 16, issue 3, 306-312

Abstract: We extend the results of Bartling and Fischbacher (Rev. Econ. Stud. 79(1):67–87, 2012 ) by showing that, by delegating to an intermediary, a dictator facing an allocation decision can effectively shift blame onto the delegee even when doing so necessarily eliminates the possibility of a fair outcome. Dictators choosing selfishly via an intermediary are punished less and earn greater profits than those who do so directly. Despite being powerless to influence the fairness of the outcome, an intermediary given the choice between two unfair outcomes is punished more than when the dictator chooses one directly. This is not the case when the intermediary merely can initiate the random selection of one of the outcomes. Our findings reinforce and clarify the usefulness of agency as a tool to evade perceived culpability. Copyright Economic Science Association 2013

Keywords: Intermediation; Punishment; Delegation; Blame shifting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9335-7

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