New insights into conditional cooperation and punishment from a strategy method experiment

Stephen Cheung

Experimental Economics, 2014, vol. 17, issue 1, 129-153

Abstract: This paper introduces new experimental designs to examine how conditional cooperation and punishment behaviours respond to the full range of variation in the contributions of others. It is shown that contributions become significantly more selfish-biased as others contribute more unequally, while punishment increases both with decreasing contributions by the target player and increasing contributions by a third player. Low contributors who punish antisocially do not direct their punishment specifically toward high contributors, while their beliefs indicate that they expect to themselves be punished. Copyright The Author(s) 2014

Keywords: Selfish bias; Conditional cooperation; Punishment; Strategy method; C72; C91; D70; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Related works:
Working Paper: New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment (2012)
Working Paper: New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:17:y:2014:i:1:p:129-153

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-013-9360-1

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