New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment

Stephen Cheung

No 5689, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper introduces new experimental designs to enrich understanding of conditional cooperation and punishment in public good games. The key to these methods is to elicit complete contribution or punishment profiles using the strategy method. It is found that the selfish bias in conditional cooperation is made significantly worse when other players contribute more unequally. Contingent punishment strategies are found to increase with decreasing contributions by the target player and also increasing contributions by a third player. "Antisocial" punishments are not directed specifically toward high contributors, but may be motivated by pre-emptive retaliation against punishment a player expects to incur.

Keywords: strategy method; public good experiment; conditional cooperation; selfish bias; punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - revised version published in: Experimental Economics, 2014, 17 (1), 129-153

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Related works:
Journal Article: New insights into conditional cooperation and punishment from a strategy method experiment (2014)
Working Paper: New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment (2012)
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