Social comparisons in wage delegation: experimental evidence

Gary Charness, Ramon Cobo-Reyes, Juan A. Lacomba (), Francisco Lagos and Jose Maria Perez
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Juan A. Lacomba: University of Granada & Globe
Jose Maria Perez: University of Granada

Experimental Economics, 2016, vol. 19, issue 2, No 10, 433-459

Abstract: Abstract We make two main contributions in this article. We examine whether social comparisons affects workers’ performance when a firm can choose workers’ wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect workers’ performance. Our second contribution is methodological. We find that our treatment effects are present with both stated effort and a real-effort task, which suggests that both approaches may yield similar results in labor experiments.

Keywords: Delegation; Discrimination; Experiment; Real effort; Social comparisons; Stated effort (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 J3 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Working Paper: Social comparisons in wage delegation: Experimental evidence (2013)
Working Paper: Social Comparisons in Wage Delegation: Experimental Evidence (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9448-x

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