Leadership effectiveness and institutional frames

Gerrit Frackenpohl, Adrian Hillenbrand and Sebastian Kube
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Gerrit Frackenpohl: University of Bonn
Adrian Hillenbrand: University of Bonn

Experimental Economics, 2016, vol. 19, issue 4, No 8, 842-863

Abstract: Abstract Leadership mechanisms provide a potential means to mitigate social dilemmas, but empirical evidence on the success of such mechanisms is mixed. In this paper, we explore the institutional frame as a relevant factor for the effectiveness of leadership. We compare subjects’ behavior in public-goods experiments that are either framed positively (give-some game) or negatively (take-some game). We observe that leader and follower decisions are sensitive to the institutional frame. Leaders contribute less in the take-some game, and the correlation between leaders’ and followers’ contribution is weaker in the take-some game. Additionally, using a strategy method to elicit followers’ reactions at the individual level, we find evidence for the malleability of followers’ revealed cooperation types. Taken together, the leadership institution is found to be less efficient in the take- than in the give-frame, both in games that are played only once and repeatedly.

Keywords: Leadership; Framing; Social dilemma; Public goods; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D02 D03 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9470-z

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