Cheating, incentives, and money manipulation

Gary Charness, Celia Blanco-Jimenez (), Lara Ezquerra and Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
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Celia Blanco-Jimenez: Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

Experimental Economics, 2019, vol. 22, issue 1, No 7, 155-177

Abstract: Abstract We use different incentive schemes to study truth-telling in a die-roll task when people are asked to reveal the number rolled privately. We find no significant evidence of cheating when there are no financial incentives associated with the reports, but do find evidence of such when the reports determine financial gains or losses (in different treatments). We find no evidence of loss aversion in the standard case in which subjects receive their earnings in a sealed envelope at the end of the session. When subjects manipulate the possible earnings, we find evidence of less cheating, particularly in the loss setting; in fact, there is no significant difference in behavior between the non-incentivized case and the loss setting with money manipulation. We interpret our findings in terms of the moral cost of cheating and differences in the perceived trust and beliefs in the gain and the loss frames.

Keywords: Cheating; Lying; Incentives; Loss aversion; Framing; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 B49 C91 D82 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9584-1

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