Centrality and cooperation in networks

Boris van Leeuwen (), Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona and Arthur Schram

Experimental Economics, 2019, vol. 22, issue 1, No 8, 178-196

Abstract: Abstract We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, groups with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.

Keywords: Cooperation; Centrality; Public goods; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D02 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9592-1

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