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Bargaining under time pressure from deadlines

Emin Karagözoğlu () and Martin Kocher ()

Experimental Economics, 2019, vol. 22, issue 2, No 7, 419-440

Abstract: Abstract We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure from deadlines in a rich-context bargaining game with an induced reference point at the 2/3-1/3 distribution. Our results show that first proposals, concessions, and settlements are very similar for different time-pressure levels. Nevertheless, time pressure systematically influences the type of agreements reached: the likelihood of bargainers reaching agreements on the equal split is lower under time pressure. Furthermore, disagreements and last-moment-agreements (conditional on reaching an agreement) are more frequently observed under time pressure, though the effect on last-moment agreements disappears when disagreements are included in the analysis. Finally, the effect of time-pressure on the frequency of disagreements is stronger for those pairs with higher tension in first proposals.

Keywords: Bargaining; Deadline effect; Disagreements; Reference points; Time pressure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C91 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9579-y

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