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Reference point effects in legislative bargaining: experimental evidence

Nels Christiansen () and John Kagel
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Nels Christiansen: Trinity University

Experimental Economics, 2019, vol. 22, issue 3, No 8, 735-752

Abstract: Abstract Recent interest in reducing budget deficits raises questions regarding the impact on legislative bargaining of cuts versus increases in government spending. Using an experimental design where the outcomes are theoretically isomorphic results in significant differences in bargaining outcomes: There are longer delays in reaching agreement with cuts than with increases, along with which legislative types get their proposals passed. These results can be attributed to a change in agents’ reference point in conjunction with differential responses to gains versus losses.

Keywords: Reference point effects; Legislative bargaining; Budget deficits versus budget surpluses; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C52 C92 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9559-7

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