Strategic gaze: an interactive eye-tracking study

Jan Hausfeld, K. von Hesler and Susanne Goldlücke
Additional contact information
K. von Hesler: University of Konstanz

Experimental Economics, 2021, vol. 24, issue 1, No 8, 177-205

Abstract: Abstract We present an interactive eye-tracking study that explores the strategic use of gaze. We analyze gaze behavior in an experiment with four simple games. The game can either be a competitive (hide & seek) game in which players want to be unpredictable, or a game of common interest in which players want to be predictable. Gaze is transmitted either in real time to another subject, or it is not transmitted and therefore non-strategic. We find that subjects are able to interpret non-strategic gaze, obtaining substantially higher payoffs than subjects who do not see gaze. If gaze is transmitted in real time, gaze becomes more informative in the common interest games and players predominantly succeed to coordinate on efficient outcomes. In contrast, gaze becomes less informative in the competitive game.

Keywords: Eye-tracking; Focal points; Signaling; Hide & seek (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D01 D83 D87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10683-020-09655-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Gaze: An Interactive Eye-Tracking Study (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:24:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10683-020-09655-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09655-x

Access Statistics for this article

Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair

More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().