Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions

Maria Karmeliuk (), Martin Kocher and Georg Schmidt ()
Additional contact information
Maria Karmeliuk: Novosibirsk State University
Georg Schmidt: University of Vienna

Experimental Economics, 2022, vol. 25, issue 5, No 2, 1327-1348

Abstract: Abstract Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However, we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we provide evidence that the observed difference could be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams. Emotions seem to play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ between individuals and teams.

Keywords: Auctions; Team decision-making; Experiment; Overbidding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09769-4

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