Morally monotonic choice in public good games

James Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj and Susan Xu Tang ()
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Susan Xu Tang: Arizona State University

Experimental Economics, 2023, vol. 26, issue 3, No 9, 697-725

Abstract: Abstract Rational choice theory, including models of social preferences, is challenged by decades of robust data from public good games. Provision of public goods, funded by lump-sum taxation, does not crowd out private provision on a one-for-one basis. Provision games elicit more of a public good than payoff-equivalent appropriation games. This paper offers a morally monotonic choice theory that incorporates observable moral reference points and is consistent with the two empirical findings. The model has idiosyncratic features that motivate a new experimental design. Data from our new experiment and three previous experiments favor moral monotonicity over alternative models including rational choice theory, prominent belief-based models of kindness, and popular reference-dependent models with loss aversion.

Keywords: Public goods; Experiment; Payoff equivalence; Non-binding contractions; Rational choice; Morally monotonic choice; Belief-based kindness choice; Reference-dependent choice with loss aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Morally Monotonic Choice in Public Good Games (2024)
Working Paper: Morally Monotonic Choice in Public Good Games (2020)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09787-2

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