Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game

John Kagel and Katherine Wolfe ()

Experimental Economics, 2001, vol. 4, issue 3, 203-219

Abstract: Two recent models incorporating fairness considerations into the economics literature based on agents' concerns about the distribution of payoffs between themselves and others (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 114 (3), 769–816; Bolton-Ockenfels, 2000, American Economic Review. 90, 166–193) are investigated using a new three-person ultimatum game: One person allocates a sum of money to two others, one of which is randomly chosen to accept or reject the offer. Rejection gives both the responder and the proposer zero income and a positive consolation prize for the non-responder. The data show essentially no reductions in rejection rates, holding offers constant, with and without consolation prizes, contrary to both models' predictions. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Keywords: ultimatum game; income inequality aversion; fairness models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1013290819565

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