Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games
David Cooper (),
Nick Feltovich (),
Alvin Roth () and
Rami Zwick ()
Experimental Economics, 2003, vol. 6, issue 2, 181-207
Learning models predict that the relative speed at which players in a game adjust their behavior has a critical influence on long term behavior. In an ultimatum game, the prediction is that proposers learn not to make small offers faster than responders learn not to reject them. We experimentally test whether relative speed of learning has the predicted effect, by manipulating the amount of experience accumulated by proposers and responders. The experiment allows the predicted learning by responders to be observed, for the first time. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003
Keywords: Game Theory; learning; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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