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Tax compliance under tax regime changes

Friedrich Heinemann and Martin Kocher

International Tax and Public Finance, 2013, vol. 20, issue 2, 225-246

Abstract: We focus on the compliance effects of tax regime changes. According to the economic model of tax evasion, a tax reform should affect compliance through its impact on tax rates and incentives. Our findings demonstrate the importance of at least two further effects not covered by the traditional model: First, ceteris paribus reform losers tend to evade more taxes after the reform. Second, a reform from a proportionate to a progressive system decreases compliance compared to a switch in the reverse direction. However, the level of compliance is generally higher under the progressive than under the proportionate regime. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Tax reforms; Tax compliance; Experiment; C72; C91; H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Working Paper: Tax compliance under tax regime changes (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:20:y:2013:i:2:p:225-246

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DOI: 10.1007/s10797-012-9222-3

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