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Tax compliance under tax regime changes

Friedrich Heinemann and Martin Kocher

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we focus on the compliance effects of tax regime changes. According to the economic model of tax evasion, a tax reform should affect compliance through its impact on tax rates and incentives. Our findings demonstrate the importance of at least two further effects not covered by the traditional model: First, reform losers tend to evade more taxes after the reform. Second, a reform from a proportionate to a progressive system decreases compliance compared to a switch in the reverse direction. However, the level of compliance is generally higher under a progressive than under a proportionate regime.

Keywords: tax reforms; tax compliance; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11443/1/Heinemann_Kocher_20100320.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Tax compliance under tax regime changes (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax compliance under tax regime changes (2013)
Working Paper: Tax compliance under tax regime changes (2010) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:11443

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