A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution

Parkash Chander and Henry Tulkens

International Tax and Public Finance, 1995, vol. 2, issue 2, 279-293

Keywords: cost of abatement; damage function; free riding; partial agreement Nash equilibrium; γ andα cores; optimal emission policy; international transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (227)

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Related works:
Chapter: A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution (2006)
Working Paper: A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution (1995)
Working Paper: A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution (1994)
Working Paper: A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution (1994)
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00877502

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