A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution

Parkash Chander and Henry Tulkens

No 1994048, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: For a simple economic model of transfrontier pollution, widely used in theoretical studies of international treaties bearing on joint abatement, we exhibit in this paper a scheme for sharing national abatement costs, through international financial transfers, which is inspired by a very classical solution concept offered in the theory of cooperative games, namely the "core" of a game. The scheme has the following properties: (i) total damage and abatement costs in all countries are minimized (optimality property), and (ii) no "coalition", Le. subset, of countries can achieve lower such total costs for its members by taking another course of action in terms of emissions and/or transfers, under some reasonable assumption as to the reactions of those not in the coalition (core property).

Date: 1994-10-01
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Related works:
Chapter: A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution (2006)
Journal Article: A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution (1995)
Working Paper: A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution (1995)
Working Paper: A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution (1994)
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