A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution

Parkash Chander and Henry Tulkens

Chapter Chapter 9 in Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, 2006, pp 176-193 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract For a simple economic model of transfrontier pollution, widely used in theoretical studies of international treaties bearing on joint abatement, we offer in this paper a scheme for sharing national abatement costs through international financial transfers that is inspired by a classical solution concept from the theory of cooperative games—namely, the core of a game. The scheme has the following properties: total damage and abatement costs in all countries are minimized (optimality property), and no coalition or subset of countries can achieve lower total costs for its members by taking another course of action in terms of emissions or transfers, under some reasonable assumption about the reactions of those not in the coalition (core property). In the concluding section economic interpretations of the scheme are proposed, including its connection with the free riding problem.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Public Good; Cooperative Game; Abatement Cost; Cooperative Agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution (1995)
Working Paper: A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution (1995)
Working Paper: A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution (1994)
Working Paper: A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution (1994)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-25534-7_11

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9780387255347

DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-25534-7_11

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().