Inducing Risk-Neutral Preferences: Further Analysis of the Data

James Cox and Ronald Oaxaca

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1995, vol. 11, issue 1, 65-79

Abstract: The lottery payoff procedure does not successfully induce risk-neutral bidding behavior in first-price, sealed-bid auctions. This conclusion follows from both ordinary-least-squares estimation with natural data and least-absolute-deviation estimation with transformed data from numerous experimental designs. Lottery payoffs do not succeed in inducing behavior predicted from standard expected utility theory assumptions or from assumed utility from winning and/or income thresholds. In contrast, first-price auction experiments with monetary payoffs yield results that are consistent with general models of bidding in the independent private values information environment. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1995
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