EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

Alejandro Caparros (), Jean-Christophe Pereau and Tarik Tazdaït

Public Choice, 2004, vol. 121, issue 3, 455-480

Abstract: This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, whilenegotiating with the North about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future Southern engagement. The papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results showthat, depending on their characteristics, the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-004-2683-x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information (2003) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:121:y:2004:i:3:p:455-480

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-004-2683-x

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2020-11-08
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:121:y:2004:i:3:p:455-480