North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information
Alejandro Caparros (),
Jean-Christophe Pereau and
Public Choice, 2004, vol. 121, issue 3, 455-480
This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, whilenegotiating with the North about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future Southern engagement. The papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results showthat, depending on their characteristics, the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
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Working Paper: North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information (2004)
Working Paper: North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information (2003)
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