North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

Alexandro Caparros, Jean-Christophe Pereau and Tarik Tazdaït
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Alexandro Caparros: IEG - Department of Economics, Institute of Economics and Geography (IEG) - CSIC - Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas [España] = Spanish National Research Council [Spain]

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Abstract: This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.

Keywords: Bargaining theory; Asymmetric information; Climate change; International cooperation.; International cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00009823v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published in Public Choice, 2004, 121 (3-4), pp.455-480. ⟨10.1007/s11127-004-2683-x⟩

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Journal Article: North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information (2004)
Working Paper: North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00009823

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-004-2683-x

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