North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information
Alejandro Caparros (),
Jean-Christophe Pereau and
No 2003.09, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.
Keywords: Bargaining theory; asymmetric information; climate change; international cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D74 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Journal Article: North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information (2004)
Working Paper: North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.09
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