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Politicians: be killed or survive

Benno Torgler and Bruno Frey

Public Choice, 2013, vol. 156, issue 1, 357-386

Abstract: In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. To investigate this phenomenon, rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using a large data set covering close to 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well-functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and a stronger civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Assassinations; Rational choice; Governance; Democracy; Dictatorship; Deterrence; Protection; D01; D70; K14; K42; Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Related works:
Working Paper: Politicians: Be Killed or Survive (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Politicians: Be Killed or Survive (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Politicians: Be Killed or Survive (2008) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9908-6

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