Politicians: Be Killed or Survive
Bruno Frey and
Benno Torgler
CREMA Working Paper Series from Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
Abstract:
In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.
Keywords: Assassinations; rational choice; governance; democracy; dictatorship; deterrence; protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D70 K14 K42 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Politicians: be killed or survive (2013) 
Working Paper: Politicians: Be Killed or Survive (2008) 
Working Paper: Politicians: Be Killed or Survive (2008) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cra:wpaper:2008-25
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