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Politicians: Be Killed or Survive

Bruno Frey and Benno Torgler

No 391, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.

Keywords: Assassinations; rational choice; governance; democracy; dictatorship; deterrence; protection. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D70 K14 K42 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his, nep-law and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/52344/1/iewwp391.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Politicians: be killed or survive (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Politicians: Be Killed or Survive (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Politicians: Be Killed or Survive (2008) Downloads
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