(De)Centralization and voter turnout: theory and evidence from German municipalities

Claus Michelsen, Peter Boenisch and Benny Geys
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Peter Bönisch

Public Choice, 2014, vol. 159, issue 3, 469-483

Abstract: A vast academic literature illustrates that voter turnout is affected by the institutional design of elections (e.g., compulsory voting, electoral system, postal or Sunday voting). In this article, we exploit a simple Downsian theoretical framework to argue that the institutional framework of public good provision—and, in particular, the distribution of political and administrative competences across government levels—likewise affects voters’ turnout decisions by influencing the expected net benefit of voting. Empirically, we exploit the institutional variation across German municipalities to test this proposition, and find supportive evidence. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: D70; D72; H11; H40; Voter turnout; Institutions; Federalism; Paradox of voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:159:y:2014:i:3:p:469-483

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0061-2

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