Environmental Regulation and the Eco-Industry

Maia David and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2005, vol. 28, issue 2, 155 pages

Abstract: This paper re-examines environmental regulation, under the assumption that pollution abatement technologies and services are provided by an imperfectly competitive environment industry. It is shown that each regulatory instrument (emission taxes and quotas; design standards; and voluntary agreements) has a specific impact on the price-elasticity of the polluters’ demand for abatement services, hence on the market power of the eco-industry and the resulting cost of abatement. This implies that the optimal pollution tax will be higher than the marginal social cost of pollution, while a voluntary approach to pollution abatement may fail unless the eco-industry itself is willing to participate. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: pollution regulation; end-of-pipe pollution abatement; environment industry; H23; L13; Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (100)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Environmental Regulationand the Eco-Industry (2005)
Working Paper: Environmental Regulation and the Eco-Industry (2005)
Working Paper: Environmental regulation and the eco-industry (2005)
Working Paper: Environmental Regulation and the Eco-Industry (2004)
Working Paper: Environmental Regulation and the Eco-industry (2004)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-005-3106-8

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