Environmental Regulationand the Eco-Industry
Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné and
No 2005.56, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
This paper re-examines environmental regulation, under the assumption that pollution abatement technologies and services are provided by an imperfectly competitive environment industry. It is shown that each regulatory instrument (emission taxes and quotas; design standards; and voluntary agreements) has a specific impact on the price-elasticity of the polluters’ demand for abatement services, hence on the market power of the eco-industry and the resulting cost of abatement. This implies that the optimal pollution tax will be higher than the marginal social cost of pollution, while a voluntary approach to pollution abatement may fail unless the eco-industry itself is willing to participate.
Keywords: Pollution regulation; End-of-pipe pollution abatement; Environment industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 L13 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-env and nep-reg
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Journal Article: Environmental Regulation and the Eco-Industry (2005)
Working Paper: Environmental Regulation and the Eco-Industry (2005)
Working Paper: Environmental regulation and the eco-industry (2005)
Working Paper: Environmental Regulation and the Eco-Industry (2004)
Working Paper: Environmental Regulation and the Eco-industry (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.56
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