 Environmental Regulation and the Eco-IndustryMaia David and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné Post-Print from HAL Abstract: This paper re-examines environmental regulation, under the assumption that pollution abatement technologies and services are provided by an imperfectly competitive environment industry. It is shown that each regulatory instrument (emission taxes and quotas; design standards; and voluntary agreements) has a speci c impact on the price-elasticity of the polluters' demand for abatement services, hence on the market power of the eco-industry and the resulting cost of abatement. This implies that the optimal pollution tax will be higher than the marginal social cost of pollution, while a voluntary approach to pollution abatement may fail unless the eco-industry itself is willing to participate. Keywords: Environment industry; end-of-pipe pollution abatement; pollution regulation; Entreprise; Taxe environnementale; Incitation; Oligopole; Politique environnementale (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2005, 28 (2), pp.141-155. ⟨10.1007/s11149-005-3106-8⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02368503 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-005-3106-8 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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