Environmental Regulation and the Eco-Industry
Maia David and
Post-Print from HAL
This paper re-examines environmental regulation, under the assumption that pollution abatement technologies and services are provided by an imperfectly competitive environment industry. It is shown that each regulatory instrument (emission taxes and quotas; design standards; and voluntary agreements) has a speci c impact on the price-elasticity of the polluters' demand for abatement services, hence on the market power of the eco-industry and the resulting cost of abatement. This implies that the optimal pollution tax will be higher than the marginal social cost of pollution, while a voluntary approach to pollution abatement may fail unless the eco-industry itself is willing to participate.
Keywords: end-of-pipe pollution abatement; pollution regulation; Environment industry; Entreprise; Taxe environnementale; Incitation; Oligopole; Politique environnementale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02368503
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer Verlag, 2005, 28 (2), pp.141-155. ⟨10.1007/s11149-005-3106-8⟩
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Journal Article: Environmental Regulation and the Eco-Industry (2005)
Working Paper: Environmental Regulationand the Eco-Industry (2005)
Working Paper: Environmental regulation and the eco-industry (2005)
Working Paper: Environmental Regulation and the Eco-Industry (2004)
Working Paper: Environmental Regulation and the Eco-industry (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02368503
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().