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Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt () and Christian Wey

Review of Industrial Organization, 2021, vol. 59, issue 1, No 1, 12 pages

Abstract: Abstract We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.

Keywords: Merger remedies; Merger control; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Evidence production in merger control: The role of remedies (2016) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-021-09813-2

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