Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt () and Christian Wey

No 8915, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.

Keywords: merger remedies; merger control; antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies (2021)
Working Paper: Evidence production in merger control: The role of remedies (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8915

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