Olson VS. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict

Joan Esteban ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: József Sákovics

Theory and Decision, 2003, vol. 55, issue 4, 339-357

Abstract: We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and -- in case they win -- later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and varying vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.

Date: 2003
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Working Paper: Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict (2015)
Working Paper: Olson vs. Coase: coalitional worth in conflict (2002)
Working Paper: Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional worth in conflict (2002)
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