Olson vs. Coase: coalitional worth in conflict

Joan Esteban () and József Sákovics

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and - in case they win - later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.

Keywords: coalition formation; conflict; alliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2002-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/id81_esedps.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict (2015)
Journal Article: Olson VS. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict (2003)
Working Paper: Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional worth in conflict (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:81

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